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Abstract
This paper aims at examining whether an increased stringency of Intellectual Prop-
erty Right (IPR) protection is apt to stimulate international cooperation on research
projects between developed and emerging countries. To address this issue, we look
both at scientiﬁc and technological collaborations within the pharmaceutical do-
main, and we adopt a gravity framework to assess the impact of the IPR level on
bilateral R&D cooperation. The analysis is conducted using data from patent and
publication databases, and the results provide a sound test of conﬂicting theories on
IPR enforcement and international collaborations in pharmaceutical research.
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11 Introduction
In the last decades the need to have a stronger system of Intellectual Property Rights
(IPR) has been one of the most debated questions for many countries. On this regard,
the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) has
represented an important evolution of the IPR regime at the international level. The
new rules have been introduced to establish a minimum standard in the protection of
the IPR, with the aim to facilitate the transfer of innovation among countries, and to
foster the cooperation between the developed and developing world.
It is widely recognized that an eﬀective IPR system may facilitate the transfer of
technology in the market for ideas (Nelson and Merges, 1990; Arora et al., 2001; Gans
et al., 2002), where organizations prefer to rely on cooperative agreements rather than
engage in competition, especially among R&D intensive industries (see D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin, 1988; Lerner and Merges, 1998; Hagedoorn, 2002). By cooperating,
ﬁrms take the advantage to share the cost related to the R&D investments along with
a reduction of those investments connected with the commercialization of the invention
(Gans et al., 2002). Moreover, R&D collaboration with other sources located in diﬀerent
countries allows ﬁrms to engage in joint research programs that oﬀer additional resources
targeted to the local needs (Correa, 2007).
To this end, the degree of IPR protection represents a crucial factor in the decision-
making about international R&D partnering (Hagerdoorn, et al., 2005). An eﬀective
protection of IPR may create incentives to invest in those countries where the develop-
ment of new invention was based on the imitation process.
Despite the growing theoretical literature about the role played by patents in the
innovation process, only scattered empirical evidence is available about the eﬀect of the
new IPR system on cooperation and technology transfer at the international level.
In this paper we report a novel empirical strategy to examine whether the increased
strength of IPR protection, introduced by the TRIPs agreement, is able to eﬀectively
spur the technology transfer measured by international cooperation between selected
WTO members. We consider both technological and scientiﬁc collaborations focusing
on the pharmaceutical industry. The selected industry is the leading example of a
science-based sector (Pavitt, 1984), therefore it is important to look at the dynamics
characterizing the collaborations both in science and technology. The drug development
process heavily relies on the advances in basic understanding of biological processes.
Using a gravity approach, we build a dataset covering a broad international panel of
countries over the period from 1978 to 2010, and count the number of patented drugs
2and health-related publications jointly signed by researchers located in the developed
and developing world. Patents and scientiﬁc publications are widely used to proxy,
respectively, technological and scientiﬁc capabilities of economic agents (Griliches, 1990;
Han, 2007).
We use as a natural experiment the new regulations introduced by the TRIPs agree-
ment. Although, the agreement came into force on January 1st, 1995, all developing
countries were allowed to retain their own national patent regime until 2000, with spe-
cial transition rules applied to areas of technology where patent protection was not
provided at signing. Pharmaceutical products are the leading example of such a sec-
tor, and full protection was required from 1st January 2005.1 The required changes led
by the reform provide an unique opportunity to estimate the impact of a stricter IPR
system on technological and scientiﬁc cooperation.
Of course the patent system is not the only mechanism available to spur innovation
eﬀorts (Chin and Grossman, 1990). Secrecy and licensing agreements can be more
eﬀective than patents in the appropriation of the returns from R&D (Cohen et al., 2000;
Gallini and Scotchmer, 2001). However, patent protection is particularly relevant in our
ﬁeld of exploration, i.e. the pharmaceutical industry, as this sector does widely rely on
patents to appropriate the returns from R&D investments (Cohen et al., 2000; Guellec,
2007).
Our results indicate that the stronger protection of IPR has failed to provide a stim-
ulus to technological pharmaceutical collaborations between the analyzed WTO mem-
bers, as measured by joint patents. Our ﬁnding is in line with the theory that sustains
a positive causal relationship between competition and innovation. A reduction in the
imitation process due to a stronger patent protection causes a fall in the rate of inno-
vation (see, among others, Aghion et al., 2001, 2005). On the contrary, we ﬁnd that
scientiﬁc collaborations beneﬁt from a stronger IPR regime, providing new evidence in
the literature discussing the eﬀect of IPR on scientiﬁc research (Heller and Eisenberg,
1998; Murray and Stern, 2007; Lach and Schankerman, 2008).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the main literature about inter-
national technology transfer and cooperation. Section 3 describes the data and empirical
measures used in the analysis, while in Section 4 we test the eﬀect of increased protection
of IPR on technological and scientiﬁc collaborations and we report our ﬁndings. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
1The least-developed members of WTO have been recognized the pos-
sibility to postpone the enforcement of the new rules to 2016 (see
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/trips e/factsheet pharm04 e.htm ).
32 Literature Review
By means of technology transfer, scholars refer to the wide process by which institution
and organizations interact with the aim to generate and promote new ideas (see, among
others, Bozeman, 2000). No direct measure of international technology transfer exists,
and both theory and empirical evidence have relied mainly on material measures, such
as foreign direct investments (FDI), trade ﬂows, as well as royalty payments and patents
(Gans et al., 2002). Following Bozeman’s deﬁnition, we compute technology transfer by
counting the number of joint patents and publications at the international level. Even
though this is admittedly one of the many forms of collaborative research, it has been
chosen because it involves direct communication between researchers in the two countries.
As a matter of fact, face-to-face situations are essential for ensuring the transfer of both
codiﬁed and uncodiﬁed (tacit) knowledge (Teece, 1981).
The theoretical literature provides grounds to the idea that an increase in the strin-
gency of the IPR can be beneﬁcial for the transfer of technology (e.g. Grossman and Lai,
2004; Valletti and Szymanski, 2005). With an eﬀective IPR system the innovator is more
willing to operate where the imitation process is not allowed (Lai, 1998). In a model
with endogenous imitation and innovation, a tighter patent law makes more costly the
imitation process. As a result, innovators ﬁnd it advantageous to reallocate their pro-
duction in those countries where the new IPR system have been introduced (Branstetter
and Saggi, 2009). These models follow the Schumpeterian approach according to which
the innovation is driven by those ﬁrms which become monopolist thanks to the exclusive
use of their invention. However from an opposite point of view, if the imitation process
is allowed, due to the presence of a neck-to-neck competition, a ﬁrm may have incentive
to innovate as ﬁrst (see, among others, Blundell et al., 1999; Aghion et al., 2001, 2005).
Although the theory indicates that the scales are tipped in favor of a positive re-
lationship between IPR and FDI, the empirical evidence is far from being suﬃcient to
conﬁrm this conjecture. It seems that the relationship weakens at higher levels of pro-
tection, and the eﬀect is largely dependent upon the characteristics of the country in
terms of FDI, import ﬂows, and income level. In particular, in assessing the eﬀects on
FDI, we have to consider also that a stronger IPR system causes a reduction in the cost
of enforcing licensing contracts, making the use of licensing more attractive, further en-
hancing the volume of FDI (Yang and Maskus, 2001). Much of this literature underlines
how IPR alone is not able to work as incentive to knowledge transfer, also large markets
and strong technological capabilities are required (Grossman and Lai, 2004).
Under a diﬀerent perspective, other studies underline the role of trade in driving
4innovation and technology transfer between countries. The basic idea builds on the fact
that imports act as a means through which new technologies can be introduced in the
receiving countries. Maskus and Penubarti (1995) have used an extended version of the
Helpman-Krugman model of monopolistic competition to measure the eﬀect of the patent
protection on international trade ﬂows. Their study points out how an increase in the
stringency of the IPR can have a positive impact in terms of increased ﬂows of bilateral
trade in developing countries. Their results are conﬁrmed by Primo Braga and Fink
(1997), who show a positive link between tighter patent protection and manufacturing
trade ﬂows. Empirical works analyzing the impact of IPR reforms often do not take into
account the eﬃcacy of enforcement, strictly correlated with country’s characteristics.
Branstetter et al. (2006) analyze whether a stronger IPR system accelerates technology
transfer. Building on aﬃliate-level data and aggregate patent data of US multinational
ﬁrms over the period 1982-1999, they study the eﬀect of patent protection reforms on
the royalty payments and R&D expenditures. Their results show that stronger IPR
encourages multinational ﬁrms to engage in larger technology transfer, as they ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant rise in the number of patents ﬁled by nonresidents after the IPR reform.2 More
recently, Park and Lippoldt (2008) have studied how trade ﬂows (including licensing
and FDI) for diﬀerent sectors could serve as a means for technology transfer directed
toward the developing countries. They investigate the role played by the strength of
the new IPR system, as proxied by a set of indicators that includes patents, copyrights
and trademark rights. Their results show that trade inﬂows in developing countries
are positively associated with the strength of patent protection, where an enforced IPR
system facilitates foreign investments for the development of new innovations.3 On
the contrary, evaluating the eﬀects of TRIPs agreement on new medical treatment, Kyle
and McGahan (2011) show that litte R&D eﬀorts have been addressed outside developed
countries.
Despite the growing literature about the strategic use of R&D cooperation (e.g.
Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998; Hagedoorn, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004), little evidence
has emerged on its employment under a strengthened IPR system. Firms and institutions
may resort to cooperation with the aim to source new ideas for innovations, reducing at
the same time the uncertainty associated with these investments. Parallel to this scope,
the use of R&D partnerships might be driven by the need to open up new markets or
to enlarge market share, and cooperation is likely to happen among rivals (d’Aspremont
2However, nothing can be inferred on the welfare eﬀects of a stronger IPR system for these countries,
because the analysis does not take into account the impact of the reforms at the national level.
3Even though the IPR system encourages ﬁrms to invest in R&D devising new technology, the same
system discourages them to introduce the second generation products (Scotchmer, 1991).
5and Jacquemin, 1988).
International R&D partnerships are very much dependent on the legal system in
place in the country partners. A well deﬁne IPR system might work as an attraction
force for R&D cooperation, especially at an international level where it is expected to be
a decisive factor (Coe, Helpman and Hoﬀmaister, 2009). Exhibiting the characteristic of
public good, the introduction of new knowledge may be prevented from a weak patent
system especially in those countries where innovation has relied mainly on the imitation
process. Instead, with certain appropriability of property rights, joint R&D investments
are able to generate positive spillovers, especially among those industries that hinge
mainly on patents for the appropriation of R&D returns (Griliches, 1990).
In the Science domain, a growing “anti-commons” argument points to the negative
eﬀect of IPR on the free ﬂow of scientiﬁc knowledge, by limiting researchers in building
on available discoveries (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Cooperation within universities
and research institutes is generally aimed at diﬀerent targets, for which the patent system
is thought to be irrelevant (Dasgupta and David, 1994). On the contrary, some evidence
is provided of a negative impact of IPR protection on the diﬀusion and utilization of
scientiﬁc knowledge. Murray and Stern (2007) compare publications whose knowledge
is also covered by a patent with publications that are not associated to any patents. By
taking into account the dynamics in the citation rate, the authors ﬁnd that the citation
rate of patent-paper pairs (i.e. patent and paper exploiting the same piece of knowledge)
declines approximately 10 to 20 percent after the associated patent is granted. However,
in a recent analysis Lach and Schankerman (2008) show that research outcomes beneﬁt
of pecuniary incentives. Royalty share have some real eﬀects on university research and
licensing outcomes, thus suggesting that the IPR regime can positively aﬀect scientiﬁc
productivity (Lach and Schankerman, 2008).
In this paper we take a dual approach, and we analyze the eﬀect of strengthen-
ing IPR both on technological and scientiﬁc collaborations at the international level in
the pharmaceutical domain. We take into account the joint signature of patent docu-
ments and scientiﬁc articles by researchers located in diﬀerent countries, providing novel
empirical evidence on the role of IPR regime in aﬀecting international cooperation in
pharmaceutical R&D.
3 Data and measures
Data about the international cooperation in pharmaceutical R&D are drawn and inte-
grated from diﬀerent sources. Our measure of technological and scientiﬁc collaboration
6pivots on the information contained in patents and publications. The variables were
constructed employing ad hoc queries on FreePatentsOnline search engine for inven-
tions (patents) related to pharmaceuticals,4 and from ISI Web of Knowledge for the
peer-reviewed research articles published about health-related subjects.5
The analysis focuses on collaboration between the developed world and emerging
economies. On the one side, we considered North America, i.e. USA and Canada,
European countries (including Switzerland due to the presence of the headquarter of top
pharmaceutical ﬁrms), and Japan. On the other side, emerging pharmaceutical markets
are considered, namely Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, Turkey. 6
Based on patents, a measure of technological collaboration between two countries
is computed exploiting the information about the country reported in the address of
the applicant(s).7 An international collaboration is counted if a patent is signed by
applicants located in two diﬀerent countries. With this regard, empirical literature has
shown that alliances promote technological transfer (Gomes-Casseres et al., 2006); and
we use the number of jointly-signed patents as a proxy for successful alliances (Kim and
Song, 2007). In order to identify pharmaceutical patents, the classes A61K and A61P of
the International Patent Classiﬁcation (IPC) are considered.8 The patents granted over
the period 1978-2010 have been extracted from the database.
Information about health-related research articles published over the same time pe-
riod are drawn from ISI Web of Knowledge.9 The database reports the aﬃliation of
all the authors involved in a publication, along with their full address. A scientiﬁc col-
4The FreePatentsOnline search service enables full-text search of published international patent appli-
cations from 1978 (see http://www.freepatentsonline.com). The analysis of international collaboration
is based on the count of patents submitted to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), i.e.
patents under the Paris Convention Treaty (PCT) are considered. These patents have been preferred
to patents applied for at national oﬃces (e.g. NBER patent database comprising patents granted by
the US patent and trademark oﬃce, or patents at the European patent oﬃce), as we expect patents
jointly applied for by developed and emerging countries to be intended to protect innovations both in
the developed and emerging countries, and WIPO-PCT is intended to get such a wide coverage.
5See http://apps.isiknowledge.com.
6The selected countries were originally identiﬁed by a leading consultant ﬁrm in the health care
industry as the emerging pharmaceutical markets (IMS Health; see http://www.imshealth.com). These
countries are included among the developing countries by the World Bank with the exception of South
Korea (among high-income countries from 1997).
7The applicant (or assignee) is the organization who ﬁrst claims to be the inventor and holds full
rights to the innovation.
8The class A61K includes “preparations for medical, dental, or toilet purposes”, whereas the class
A61P considers the “therapeutic activity of chemical compounds or medicinal preparations”. For further
details see: http://www.wipo.int/classiﬁcations/ipc/ipc8/?lang=en.
9Since journals publish scholarly material in a variety of matters, we conﬁne our data to research
articles that are deﬁned by their health-related contents. Particularly, the database was queried for
articles containing the following terms: pharma OR biotech OR drug OR therapeutic OR disease OR
medical.
7laboration between two countries is considered if the publication is jointly signed by
researchers located in both countries (Gl¨ anzel and Schubert, 2005).
Besides the number of collaborations, FreePatentsOnline and ISI Web of Knowledge
are also employed to measure the total production of each countries, respectively in
terms of pharmaceutical patents and scientiﬁc publications (Griliches, 1990; Han, 2007).
Two measures of the level of IPR protection are considered. We rely on data provided
by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and also published by the Economic Freedom
Network (EFN, see Gwartney and Lawson, 2008), henceforth referred to as PIPR (pro-
tection of IPR) index,10 as well as on the index of IPR protection developed by Park
and colleagues (Ginarte and Park, 1997; updated in Park, 2008). The latter measures
the strength of patent protection by aggregating ﬁve separate scores on coverage, in-
ternational treaties, duration of protection, enforcement mechanisms, and restrictions
(Park, 2008). On the contrary, the index developed by the WEF is based on a survey
capturing the opinion of business executives about IPR protection. It comprises infor-
mation not only based on the subject matter that can be patented, but also about the
length of protection, the mechanisms for enforcing patent rights, the evolution of the
international patent laws (Park and Wang, 2002). The index measures the strength of
the legal structure and security of IPR.
Average values of the Park index for the countries included in the study is presented
in Table 1, whereas the evolution of the PIPR index is reported in Figure 1.
The Park index shows an increase in the protection of IPR by emerging economies
(from 2.570 in 1995, to 3.904 in 2005), even though the index is still lower than the
corresponding value for developed countries (3.904 versus 4.555 in the latest avaiable
time period). The PIPR index shows a slight increase in the year 2005 for the emerging
markets, but in the year 2009 ﬁgures are back to pre-2005 values. The general perception
about the eﬀect of TRIPs on IPR protection decreases few years after its full adoption
in the emerging markets.
10The Global Competitiveness Report relies on the Executive Opinion Survey, by which participants
evaluate on scale of 1 (the lowest) to 7 (the highest), the current conditions of their operating envi-
ronment. The Survey is carried out among (mainly large) ﬁrms representing the main sectors of the
economy, asking questions about diﬀerent aspects of the economy (including, e.g. institutions, infras-
tructures, higher education and training, etc.). As for our analysis, executives are asked to provide a
rate to intellectual property protection (including anti-counterfeiting measures) in their own country,
with 1 corresponding to very weak protection and 7 to very strong protection. This index is the source
of the data published by the EFN (Gwartney et al., 2008), that is tranformed on a 0-10 scale. We
used data from both sources keeping the 0-10 scale measure (For complete methodological details see
www.weforum.org and www.fraserinstitute.org). More speciﬁcally, the EFN reported the index of pro-
tection of IPR before the year 2005 and then switched to the more general index of protection of property
rights. For the years 2005-2009, we accessed the data by the WEF for the index of protection of IPR
(transforming the index from the 1-7 to the 0-10 scale).
8Park index 1995 2000 2005
Emerging markets Mean 2.570 3.493 3.904
Developed countries Mean 4.273 4.506 4.555
Table 1: Average value of Park index for the emerging markets in our study (Source:
our computations on Park, 2008).
Figure 1: Average value of the index of protection of IPR, 1995, 2000-2009 (Source: our
computations on WEF and EFN data)
94 Methodology and results
Gravity models have been successfully employed for studying the determinants of bilat-
eral ﬂows (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). Building on the Newton’s law of universal
gravitation, the model posits that the ﬂow Fij between two countries i and j is propor-
tional to their “masses” (respectively Mi and Mj) and inversely proportional to the











The gravity equation has been most commonly applied to study trade ﬂows, but it has
also been employed to study migration ﬂows, equity ﬂows, FDI, and knowledge ﬂows
(see e.g. Portes and Ray, 1998; Peri, 2005). Previous literature has also considered
a gravity framework for studying the internationalization of R&D activities looking at
joint patents by inventors/applicants from diﬀerent countries (Picci, 2010).
The empirical literature has taken into consideration various forces on the right hand
size, such the eﬀect of common language or international treaties (see e.g. Anderson and
Van Wincoop, 2003). We investigate whether there is a role for more stringent IPR in
fostering technological and scientiﬁc collaborations between developing and developed
world. Particularly, we aim at understanding whether the increased stringency in IPR
in the emerging markets has resulted in an increased collaboration with the developed
world.
In order to obtain an estimate of the parameters in equation (1), the model is cus-
tomarily log-linearized and ordinary least squares is applied. This traditional approach
has been recently subject to a strong critique, as it fails to provide a consistent estimate
of model elasticities if heteroschedasticity is present in the original equation (Santos Silva
and Tenreyro, 2006). As a robust alternative, the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
estimator is to be preferred, allowing the researchers to solve the consistency issue, as
well as the possibility of zero ﬂow between two countries.
In our analysis, the empirical assessment of the technological and scientiﬁc collab-
oration relies, respectively, on the number of patents co-applied by agents located in
countries i and j, and on the number of joint publications by scientists located in coun-
tries i and j.
Let Cijt be the measure of technological and scientiﬁc collaboration between country i
and country j at time t. Collaboration between North American and European countries
(i) and selected emerging markets (j) is taken into account. A gravity equation is
considered, where we include the IPR regime of country j (PIPRjt; ParkIjt, generally
10referred to as IPRjt) among the attraction forces:
E[Cijt|Xijt] = exp(β0 + β1 logMit−1 + β2 logMjt−1 + β3 logIPRjt + τt + αij), (2)
with αij representing a dyad-speciﬁc characteristics that are invariant over time (includ-
ing geographical distance), Mit−1 and Mjt−1 the “masses” of, respectively, country i and
j,11 and IPRjt measures the level of enforcement of IPR, proxied using both the index
of IPR protection published by WEF/EFN (PIPR) and the Park index (Park, 2008).
Time dummies are included in all speciﬁcations (τt).12
In order to proxy M, the international trade literature has relied on GDP and popu-
lation measures. Following the Schumpterian tradition, here we make use of the patent
stock per country when analyzing the technological collaborations, and the publication
stock in the case of scientiﬁc collaborations in order to measure technological and scien-
tiﬁc capabilities at the country level within the pharmaceutical domain (Han, 2007).13
The stocks are deﬁned as
Gk,t = Pk,t + (1 − δ)Gk,t−1, (3)
with k representing the country index and t is measured yearly from 1978 to 2010.14 We
rely on the industry-speciﬁc estimate of the depreciation rate provided by Park and Park
(2006). We apply the value for the chemical sector (also comprising pharmaceuticals)
considering δ = 13.11%.15
The model is estimated using the pre-sample mean estimator (PME) proposed by
Blundell et al. (1995; 2002) that allows for correlated ﬁxed eﬀects αij and predetermined
variables (see also Windmeijer, 2008).16 The estimator allows us to explicitly tackle the
possibility for correlation between the regressors included in the model and the dyad-
11One-year lag is considered in order to avoid endogeneity, as masses at time t also include cooperation
at time t.
12Over the analyzed time period, the Park index is only available for two years: 2000 and 2005.
Therefore the number of available observations is drastically reduced. In order to solve this issue, we
follow Picci (2010) and “extend” the Park index, imputing the value for the year 2000 to the years 2001
and 2002, and the value for the year 2005 to the year 2003-2007.
13In (unreported) preliminary analysis we experimented with various measures including GDP, R&D
expenditure, the number of researchers, and pharmaceutical production. The results were largely unsat-
isfactory as the coeﬃcients associated to these measures were largely insigniﬁcant posing concerns about
the ability of selected proxies to act as a measure of the “mass” of the countries.
14As the number of international patent applications were negligible before the year 1990, in the case
of patent, the knowledge stock is computed considering data from 1990.
15Pharmaceuticals and chemicals patents are characterized by slow rates of depreciation (Schankerman,
1998). Diﬀerent studies show that the pharmaceutical R&D (both basic research and applied research
and development) use a declining balance formula with a depreciation rate no greater than 15% (Hall et
al., 2005).
16Estimates are performed using Stata 11.
11speciﬁc component αij.17 The pre-sample mean estimator is preferred to a ﬁxed eﬀect
Poisson estimator as it also allows for the presence of feedback eﬀects between the
variables on the right hand side and the error term. We expect a dynamic eﬀect to be at
work in this context, where collaborations at time t could produce beneﬁcial eﬀects for
both countries at time t + 1 and enhance the production of knowledge. Standard errors
are estimated using the methodology proposed by Cameron et al. (2006) that allows
cluster-robust inference in the case of non-nested two-way clustering.18
As in the case of technological collaboration, our data record a large incidence of
zeroes (about 75% of observations record no jointly signed patent), we also take into
account the decision to enroll in a collaboration where the dependent variable identiﬁes
a binary outcome: ˜ Cijt = 1 if at least one joint patent/publication is recorded between
country i and country j at time t , i.e. ˜ Cijt = 1 if Cijt > 0. A random eﬀect probit
model is considered.19
Application of the pre-sample estimator is allowed by the availability of information
on the dependent variable before the year 2000 (corresponding to the ﬁrst year from
which data about IPR protection as measured by PIPR are continuously available).
Particularly, we collected information about joint cooperation in patents and scientiﬁc
publications from the year 1978.20 Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the
regressions are reported in Table 2.
Figure 2 depicts the dynamics of the average value of our dependent variables. The
year 2004 (right before the deadline for TRIPs enforcement) seems to be a break-point
in the dynamics characterizing collaboration in patents, whereas this is not the case for
scientiﬁc publications. Need it here to stress the fact that patents are recorded according
to the application date, that is closer to the actual timing of the patented invention than
the publication date. This explains the lower value of collaborations in patents recorded
in 2010.21
17As a result, we are not able to estimate the eﬀect of the distance between the two countries (as
time-invariant, and therefore included in αij). However, this eﬀect is not directly of interest to our
research.
18In our context, it is not possible to assume independence among the dyads. As an example, dyad ij
is correlated with dyad ik even if j  = k, due to the presence of county i in both dyads.
19In the case of scientiﬁc publications, only 3% of the observations record no collaboration, therefore
the analysis only relies on count data models.
20However, in the case of patents, due to the limited number of PCT application before the year 1998,
only the years 1998 and 1999 are used to compute pre-sample averages.
21Put it diﬀerently, patent data for the year 2010 are censored, due to the time lag between the
application date and the publication date (on average 1 year when PCT-WIPO patents are considered,
based on our computations). The data for the year 2009 and 2010 will not be used in the regressions
analyzing collaboration in patents. On the contrary, all available observations are exploited in the
estimation of the publication equation. Still, data about PIPR are available over the period 2000-2009.
12Variable Mean Std. error Min Max
Patents
pt coop 3.886 15.74 0 152
Mi (patent) 3780 7647 5.035 47444
Mj (patent) 702.6 957.6 4.248 8634
Publication
pu coop 58.48 145.6 0 2561
Mi (publication) 51891 80845 1194 457312
Mj (publication) 13054 12163 3117 156464
Protection of IPR
PIPR 4.056 1.089 1.900 7.300
Park index 3.699 .4936 2.270 4.330
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Figure 2: International R&D collaboration in patents (bar, left axis) and publications
(line, right axis), sample average
13Table 3 reports the estimation of the model of technological collaboration as in
equation (2), taking into account the number of, respectively, patents and publications
jointly located in country i and j.
The country masses Mi and Mj (as measured by knowledge stock), all have the
expected sign and are statistically signiﬁcant. The larger the knowledge base of each
country involved in the collaboration, the higher its “attraction force”.
With regards to the stringency of IPR, a diﬀerent eﬀect of the new rules introduced
by the TRIPs agreements on technology and science is highlighted by the regressions.
The index of IPR protection exerts a negative eﬀect on research cooperation gauged
by patents in pharmaceuticals. Stronger protection of IPR fails to provide a spur to
technological collaboration between countries, as measured by the joint ownership of the
rights to innovation (trough patents) in pharmaceuticals. One possible explanation is
that these results represent a premature investigation on the eﬀects of the stringency
of IPR in those countries for which the patent protection belongs to the recent history.
However, these results conﬁrm the theoretical prediction of some studies for which in-
creased national patent protection cuts competition, diminishing the incentives for more
investment in R&D (Helpman, 1993; Aghion et al., 2005).
Within the pharmaceutical domain, although the increased strength of IPR protec-
tion has not risen technological collaborations, we ﬁnd a positive inﬂuence on the number
of joint publications. The opposite sign of our results on technological and scientiﬁc col-
laborations could be explained considering the dual nature of scientiﬁc knowledge. In
the long term R&D investments, in particular, the distinction between basic and applied
research tends to vanish. Following the “Pasteur’s Quadrant” terminology (e.g. Stokes,
1997), joint research projects are carried out with the complementary goals of creating
a product having a commercial value (patents), and broadening the scientiﬁc knowledge
(publications) (Gans et al., 2011). What our results seem to suggest is that the use
of the patent in pharmaceuticals is likely to be postponed to later stages in order to
favor further eﬀorts in the research process starting from the initial idea (Heller and
Eisenberg, 1998). In particular, this is true when scientists are independent to address
their research following their own interests (Aghion et al., 2008). The “anti-commons”
literature points exactly to the proliferation of patents as the cause of resources under-
utilization, since the presence of numerous patent owners obstacles future cooperation
in research (among others see Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). The likelihood of this con-
tention, of course, needs to be veriﬁed in the future using a longer time span. Moreover,
the decline in joint patents following the IPR reform might be explained considering
On the contrary, all available time periods are used in the analysis of joint publications.
14Patents Publications
Probit Probit Probit Count Count Count Count Count Count
RE RE RE PME PME PME PME PME PME
IPRR measure PIPR Park Park(a) PIPR Park Park(a) PIPR Park Park(a)
Mit−1 .7123∗∗∗ .6965∗∗∗ .7357∗∗∗ .6386∗∗∗ .7459∗∗∗ .6975∗∗∗ .3218∗∗∗ .2685∗∗∗ .2927∗∗∗
(.0435) (.0881) (.0625) (.0753) (.0300) (.0041) (.0383) (.0547) (.0514)
Mjt−1 .5397∗∗∗ .6625∗∗∗ .4315∗∗∗ .6847∗∗∗ .7753∗∗∗ .6700∗∗∗ .6531∗∗∗ .6405∗∗∗ .6552∗∗∗
(.0804) (.0906) (.0391) (.0886) (.1395) (.0799) (.1759) (.2152) (.1865)
IPRRjt -.9881∗∗ -2.675∗∗∗ -.8803∗∗∗ -.3634 -3.689∗∗∗ -1.020∗∗∗ .3432∗∗ 1.157∗∗∗ .3901∗∗∗
(.4867) (.8491) (.3116) (.5844) (.4246) (.1381) (.1586) (.3467) (.0837)
Pre-sample .9760∗∗∗ .9362∗∗∗ .9238∗∗∗ .7992∗∗∗ .8769∗∗∗ .8427∗∗∗
(.0639) (.0670) (.0498) (.0813) (.0653) (.0753)
Constant -6.022∗∗∗ -4.478∗∗∗ -3.985∗∗∗ -7.139∗∗∗ -5.166∗∗∗ -5.027∗∗∗ -7.538∗∗∗ -8.005∗∗∗ -8.242∗∗∗
(.4364) (.9994) (.7758) (1.030) (.1929) (.6508) (1.542) (2.258) (1.865)
Obs. 1071 238 952 1071 238 952 1190 238 952
Log-lik. -403.86 -80.97 -343.76 – – – – – –





Standard errors robust to multi-way clustering in parenthesis (Cameron et al., 2006).
(a) Value of the Park Index for the year t is used for the period (t − 2,t + 2) (Picci, 2010).
Table 3: Gravity model of research cooperation, patents and scientiﬁc publications
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5that a better deﬁned system of rules about IPR presumably favors scientiﬁc cooperation
among scientists in developed and emerging countries, making unnecessary the recourse
to the patent to protect an idea at the early stage of the research process.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we answered the question whether the dynamics of the international coop-
eration in pharmaceutical research changes in response to an increased stringency of the
IPR protection. This research has been motivated by the recent trends in the protection
of the IPR system at the global level. Little evidence is available about this issue and we
contributed to the literature by exploring the eﬀect of IPR on the research cooperation
at the international level.
Cooperation in R&D is a key factor in the pace of innovation if we consider that the
disclosure of new ideas depends on a complex and interacting set of institutions, and the
joint ownership in R&D investment is a widely used strategy.
We estimated a gravity framework on the number of joint patents and scientiﬁc pub-
lications, focusing on the pharmaceutical research cooperation between developed and
developing countries. We obtained evidence of a negative eﬀect of the stringency of the
IPR protection on the level of technological collaboration (joint patents), whereas pos-
itive inﬂuence seems to be exerted on scientiﬁc collaboration (joint publications). This
opposing results might be explained referring to the recent “anti-commons” literature
where the use of patents at the early stage of the research process curbs the competition,
slowing down the rate of innovation. On the other hand, a decline in joint patents could
be explained by arguing that a more reliable system of IPR makes patents no more
necessary to be applied at the very beginning of the innovation process.
Two limits of our work have to be acknowledged. First, we examined the research
eﬀorts between countries, but not tackle the issue of the eﬀectiveness of a stricter IPR
system in promoting technological innovation at the country level, along with an as-
sessment in terms of economic growth. Second, our deﬁnition of collaboration relies on
jointly signed patents and papers, which is admittedly a narrow form of collaboration,
but nonetheless entailing the transfer of both codiﬁed and uncodiﬁed knowledge.
Finally, since the reform of the IPR system is very recent, interesting would be in
future to consider a longer time span, along with a wider set of industries, in order to
let the countries develop the institutions and capabilities apt at fostering collaboration
between the developed and the developing world.
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